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Economists have often argued that "pay for performance" is the optimal compensation scheme. However,
use of the simplest form of pay for performance, the piece rate, has been in decline in manufacturing
in recent decades. We show both theoretically and empirically that these changes are due to adoption
of "modern manufacturing" in which firms produce a greater variety of products to a more demanding
quality and delivery standard. 

We further develop a theory of the type of compensation system appropriate for this kind of production,
in which there is a high return to “multi-tasking”, where the same workers perform both easy-to-observe
and hard-to-observe tasks and to “just-in-time” production, which entails a high cost of holding inventory.

We test these predictions using detailed monthly information on firm outcomes and employee surveys
from four plants in two companies that adopted modern manufacturing methods and changed their
method of compensation from piece rates to either time rates or value-added gain-sharing. We find
that time rates and gain-sharing are associated with reduced employee performance on easy-to-observe
tasks, enhanced performance on hard-to-observe tasks, and improved firm profitability.  Our analysis
shows the importance of distinguishing types of incentive pay: we find that modern manufacturing
is consistent with either group incentive pay (such as gain-sharing), or no incentives (such as hourly
pay), but inconsistent with individual incentive pay (piece rates).
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Economists have often argued that "pay for performance" is the optimal compensation 
scheme (e.g., Lazear and Shaw, 2007, Shaw, 2009). However, use of the simplest form of pay for 
performance, the piece rate, has been in decline in manufacturing in recent decades. We show 
both theoretically and empirically that these changes are due to the adoption of "modern 
manufacturing" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), in which firms produce a greater variety of 
products to a more demanding quality and delivery standard. 
 The economic theory of optimal incentives suggests that changes in production 
environments should coincide with changes in the method of pay for workers (Lazear and Shaw, 
2007).  If workers produce one easy-to-monitor product and are supervised by an owner who 
both monitors and receives profits, the optimal incentive system is a piece rate (Seiler, 1984, 
Brown, 1990, Paarsch, and Shearer, 2000). Under this form of compensation, workers are paid 
based on the quantity and quality of the output produced. If markets are competitive, workers 
will receive their marginal product and owners will receive normal profits (Lazear, 2000, Halley, 
2003). 
 However in the United States, use of piece rate systems has been systematically 
declining. In the later part of the 19
th century a majority of factory workers were paid piece rates, 
and about 30 percent of manufacturers used piece rate systems in the 1930s (Brown & Philips, 
1986). Yet by the 1980s only 14 percent of employees in manufacturing worked under piece rate 
systems (Jacobsen & Skillman, 2004). By 2003, less than 5 percent of workers were paid under a 
piece rate compensation system (Schildkraut, 2003). In shoe manufacturing, for example, 90 
percent of workers were paid by piece rates in the 1940s, but by the late 1990s, less than 25 2 
 
percent were paid by this method (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1997)
1.  Other industrialized 
nations such as Britain have been experiencing similar declines in the use of piece rates in 
manufacturing (Marginson, 2010) 
We suggest that the reason for the decline in use of piece rates is the introduction of 
manufacturing methods that emphasize quality, rapid introduction of new products, and “just-in 
time” production methods. These changes have a big effect on the optimal method of pay 
because they increase the return to  
a) “multi-tasking” (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990), in which the same workers do both 
easy-to-observe tasks (such as production) and hard-to-observe tasks (such as process 
improvement) and  
b) producing exact quantities of output (no more, no less).   
In this paper, we model the impact of the changes of compensation method in such 
production environments. We consider the following methods of pay: piece rates, time rates, and 
gain sharing, in which workers receive time rates plus a (usually small) bonus linked to the 
productivity of the establishment or work group.  
We also provide evidence from six plants belonging to two firms that changed from a 
piece rate method of pay to either time rates or gain sharing. Our empirical analysis examines 
how compensation influenced productivity, profitability, and the attitudes of the workers in these 
organizations.   
  Both our theory and evidence suggest that for firms with production processes with a 
high return to multi-tasking and to producing exact levels of output, time rate pay or time rates 
                                                 
1Our analysis  differs from that of Shaw (2009), who writes, “Our knowledge of how to use HR practices evolves 
and improves over time. Thirty years ago, hourly pay was common; today, variable pay has been added.” We agree 
that group-based variable pay has been increasing (Osterman,2000), while individual-based incentives have been 
disappearing. Our paper shows that this distinction is critical: while group-based incentive pay is indeed compatible 
with modern production methods, individual incentives (piece rates) are not.  3 
 
with low-powered incentives are the optimal form of compensation. These findings may have 
implications for other industries, such as finance and health care, where firms have based pay on 
types of performance that are easily observable, even when important dimensions of 
performance are hard to observe  and measure. 
II. Background, Theory and Model 
A.  Traditional manufacturing: mass production and large-batch production 
In the later part of the 19
th century a majority of factory workers were paid piece rates 
(Brown & Philips, 1986). However, over the course of the 20
th century, many employers moved 
toward time rates. Some employers (such as Henry Ford) adopted “transfer lines,” in which work 
was transferred between stations either by machines or by a moving conveyor (assembly line). In 
either case, time rates are more advantageous than piece rates. The reason is that managers can 
obtain high effort from workers on observable tasks by noticing where the inventory piles up 
between stations,
2 without incurring the costs of piece rates we discuss below.  
Many firms did not switch to transfer lines, however, because such lines placed severe 
constraints on the variety of products that could be produced, especially before the advent of 
innovations such as flexible automation (Best, 1990; Lazonick, 1991).  Instead, many firms 
(including the two we study here) used batch production methods. For example, in the 1980s the 
firm we call “Small Parts” had a variety of products (mostly parts for cars or boats) for which 
there was continuing demand for an unchanging design.  However, the products required 
operations on different machines, performed in different orders. Setting up fixed paths for work 
to travel would have made low effort in production more observable, but would have made the 
production process very inflexible. Therefore, managers put each person in charge of a machine 
                                                 
2 Thus, workers can work together on assembly lines (“teamwork” in some definitions), yet still have observable 
individual contributions to total output (Lazonick, 1993, chapter 5). 4 
 
that could do several jobs (each with a negotiated rate), and encouraged workers to do each job 
quickly via piece rates. Since there was recurring demand for each product for a long time, 
management did not have to negotiate new piece rates very often
3. At any one time the firm 
made an intermediate number of products that did not change very often—more than 1 or 2, 
which would have made an assembly line pay off, and fewer than 50 products which would 
change in the next year, thereby requiring lots of renegotiation. Similarly, the shoe-maker we call 
Big Foot (BF) for decades had employees working on individually-paced machines being paid 
piece rates.  
B.  Modern manufacturing: quality, variety, and just-in-time production.  
In the 1990s, both Small Parts and Big Foot changed numerous aspects of their 
operations strategy, moving toward a broader product line with frequent product introductions, 
greater attention to quality and efforts to minimize inventory.  
Milgrom and Roberts (1995) call this cluster of policies “modern manufacturing”, and 
explain why these policies all changed at once:  
 
“We have argued in this paper that this clustering [of policies] is no accident. Rather, it is 
a result of the adoption by profit-maximizing firms of a coherent business strategy that exploits 
complementarities, and the trend to adopt this strategy is the result of identifiable changes in 
technology and demand.” 
 
In this paper, we extend the Milgrom and Roberts model to examine the impact on 
compensation methods of the changes in manufacturing that they and others describe. 
4 
                                                 
3 As  described below (also see Helper and Kleiner 2009), piece rates were negotiated with workers even though the 
firm was non-union. If rates were too low, workers objected to working on the new products. Management in 
principle had the right to assign workers to work on such products, but feared the loss of firm-specific human capital 
if workers quit. 
4 Others have noted similar changes in manufacturing strategy, and given them different names: “flexible 
specialization” (Piore and Sabel 1984), “lean manufacturing” (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990). The clusters 
identified by the author above are broadly similar, yet the authors disagree about the causes of the change. Milgrom 
and Roberts focus on declining costs of computers and flexible automation as driving the change (because this new 
technology lowered the cost of product variety by reducing set-up costs). Piore and Sabel  state that fragmentation of 
product demand (leading to greater benefits of product variety) was the initial cause, and Womack, Jones and Roos 
argue that the initial driver was Toyota’s innovative efforts to adapt US production methods to 1950s Japan, in 5 
 
Figure 1 describes how the features of modern manufacturing affect the returns to 
different production strategies, and how these in turn affect the optimal compensation system (in 
particular, the efficacy of piece rates)
5.   
The first feature we examine is increased attention to product quality. A desired increase 
in product quality increases the return to effort on hard-to-observe tasks, such as suggestions for 
process improvement, and avoiding hard-to-detect shortcuts. Why is quality control a hard to 
observe task? While in principle, management could only pay for good pieces under piece rates, 
this is problematic in practice, for several reasons. First, if standards for quality are high, and 
affect workers' pay, management and workers will devote costly resources to allocating (and 
avoiding) blame for quality problems rather than seeking their root causes. Second, workers are 
less likely to make suggestions to improve the product that require teamwork or cross job 
boundaries, because this would involve particularly complex rate renegotiations, not to mention 
take time away from production, which costs the worker heavily in lost piece-rate income. If 
workers do not make good suggestions, it is hard for management to know if this was because 
potential improvements do not exist, or because workers were insufficiently motivated to make 
such suggestions. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) point out that the multitask problem arises only if the 
two tasks are complementary. If they are not, then managers should design the observable tasks 
(e.g., production) to be done by one group of employees, and the unobservable tasks (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                             
which demand was fragmented and cash was scarce. In any case, as we show below, complementarity means that 
increased returns to one of these practices leads to increased returns for the others. So, for our purposes, it does not 
matter which practice was the driving force. 
5 Because the changes in production and in method of pay have complementary effects on firm performance, these 
practices will usually be adopted together, making it difficult to separately identify their impacts. Our goal instead is 
to explore the impact of these clusters of practices taken together.  6 
 
making improvements to production, fixing problems) to be done by another group with a 
different compensation scheme.  
In older methods of production, observable and unobservable tasks were separated. 
Production workers focused on producing output, and were paid a piece rate. Quality was the 
responsibility of other workers, such as inspectors (who identified defective parts) and engineers 
(who attempted to design less defect-prone products and processes); these workers were paid 
time rates.  
In contrast, proponents of “modern manufacturing” hold that multitask complementarities 
are significant. For example, while a worker is producing output, she is also observing the 
process and gaining a local knowledge available to engineers only at great cost. Thus, knowing 
how to do production gives a worker knowledge about how to improve the process (Womack, 
Jones, and Roos, 1990). However, piece rates incentivize workers to over perform on observable 
tasks such as production, and underperform on hard to observe tasks such as process 
improvement, as we show below. 
The second feature of modern manufacturing described in Table 1 is increased product 
variety.
6  Increased variety also yields increased payoff to production worker effort on hard-to-
observe tasks, such as making suggestions on how to debug the production process for new 
products, yielding a quick ramp-up to full production speed. Piece rates are problematic because 
there are significant risks for both sides in establishing rates on new products. All else equal, the 
lower the rates per piece, the higher are profits and the lower are wages. If high-seniority 
workers are risk-averse and have the ability to choose which products they work on (as at Big 
                                                 
6 In their model, Milgrom and Roberts distinguish between the number of products and product improvements, and 
find that the number of products is not necessarily complementary to other features of modern manufacturing, 
because if there is a constant rate of redesign per product, having more products increases cost. Since both a new 
product and a redesigned product usually require a new piece rate, we lump them together under the heading 
“product variety”, a feature which is complementary with other characteristics of modern manufacturing. 7 
 
Foot), experienced workers will avoid working on new products, depriving the firm of precisely 
those workers who would be most efficient at de-bugging the new process (Freeman and Kleiner, 
2005).  As Coase (1937) pointed out, establishing prices is a significant cost of using markets. As 
the frequency of product change increases, the fixed cost of haggling over the rate is spread out 
over fewer units, making a piece-rate system increasingly costly.  
The third feature we examine is just-in-time production (JIT). Proponents of JIT argue 
that holding inventory is very costly, due not just to product carrying costs, but also to costs of 
obsolescence and the impact of long lead times on quality improvement activities. (That is, if a 
long time passes between when a product is made and the discovery that it is defective, it will be 
harder to determine conditions under which it was made that might have led to the defect (e.g., 
the day was hot, the worker running the machine was inexperienced) (Womack, Jones and Roos, 
1990).  JIT is complementary not only to quality, but also to product variety, in that short set-up 
times allow a firm to produce a wider variety of products without excessive downtime or 
inventory carrying costs. Thus, the philosophy of JIT is to produce exactly the quantity 
demanded, meaning that there is a low return to the extra production incentivized by piece rates. 
JIT also increases the return to multi-tasking (since low inventory increases the return to speedy 
problem-solving).  
 To summarize, implementing modern manufacturing practices makes piece rates a less 
desirable form of compensation in two ways. First, modern manufacturing increases the return to 
multi-tasking (having the same workers perform both tasks whose output is hard to observe and 
tasks whose output is easy to observe). Specifically, workers’ responsibilities expand from 
simple physical execution of work in manufacturing to activities such as planning, decision-
making, teamwork, and problem solving (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2001; Snell and Dean, 1994). 8 
 
Performance on these tasks is difficult to observe.  As we show below, piece rates lead to the 
crowding out of effort on such tasks. Second, the extra effort on observable tasks (like 
production) that piece rates produce has low (sometimes negative) value in modern 
manufacturing, because of the high cost assigned to carrying inventory. 
Model of multi-tasking and just-in-time 
In order to analyze the situations discussed in the empirical section below, it is useful to 
formally model the effects of switching from piece-rates to time-rates (Big Foot) and from piece-
rates to gain-sharing (Small Parts)
7. Proofs of all propositions are provided in the appendix.  
Define e to be the performance level of the hard-to-observe tasks and q to be the 
quantity of output produced. e and q are determined by both employee effort ( e t  and  q t ) and 




















. The firms’ profit 
functions are given by 
L q e B    ) , (  
where B  is production technology and L is labor costs. Naturally,  0 1  B . By contrast,  2 B   
varies depending on whether q exceeds or falls short of the optimal production quantities, q ˆ . 
Specifically,  0 22  B , and  is maximized when the quantity produced matches the optimal 
production quantity, that is,  q q ˆ  . The reason behind this specification is that producing exactly 
the optimal quantity is highly important in modern manufacturing. Both over-production and 
under-production are costly, because holding very little inventory (just-in-time production) is 
highly valued (i.e.  ) ( ) ˆ ( q q     for  q q ˆ   . On the one hand, if the quantity produced exceeds 
                                                 
7 Consistent with the practice at most firms (and in contrast to Thiele, 2010), we assume the firms are constrained to 
offer the same contract to all production workers.  9 
 
the optimal quantity, q ˆ , the firm incurs costs associated with holding inventory and the 
uncertainty of being able to sell the inventory because of frequent product design changes. Thus, 
when  q q ˆ  ,  2 B  becomes smaller. And profit becomes negative, when q exceeds q ˆ by large 
amounts. On the other hand, modern manufacturers also value meeting clients’ needs quickly. If 
output falls short of the optimal quantity, it could lead to client dissatisfaction. Thus, when  q q ˆ  , 
it pays to produce more quickly ( 0 2  B ). 
Under piece rates, employees’ utility functions are  ) , ( ) )( ( q e p t t D q p e p U      , with 
D being the monetary value of the disutility associated with additional effort,  p  being the 
baseline salary under piece rates,   being the piece-rate for each unit produced, and  ) (e p being 
the probability of keeping the job based on a worker’s performance on hard-to-observe tasks, 
with the performance e being determined by effort, te, and ability, Ae. Under gain-sharing, 
employees’ utility functions become  ) , ( )
) , (
)( ( q e g t t D
N
q e B
e p U      , with   being the 
baseline salary,  N being the number of employees included in the group bonus, and  being the 
income percentage that the employer agrees to share with the workers ex ante. Under time rates, 
employees’ utility functions become ) , ( ) ( q e t t t D e p U    .  
Proposition 1: When a firm switches from piece rates to gain-sharing or time-rates, the 
gap between optimal output and actual output,  | ˆ | q q  , is smaller. 
Time-rates and gain-sharing pay employees based on obedience rather than on production 
quantity. If the employees keep the pace that the firms determine, they are paid. If not, they risk 
being fired. By contrast, under piece-rates, to make employees produce exactly the optimal 
quantities, employers need to set piece-rates such that the marginal benefit to the worker just 
equals her marginal disutility when she produces the optimal output. To the extent that optimal 10 
 
output and product designs change frequently, and employers lack information regarding 
employee utility functions, piece rates lead actual output to deviate from optimal output.  
Proposition 2. When firms switch from piece rates to gain sharing or time rates, effort 
devoted to hard-to-observe tasks,  e t , increases.  
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that since workers’ effort is limited, the more effort 
they devote to observable tasks, the less effort they are able to devote to hard-to-observe tasks. 







.  Gain-sharing rewards employees for doing hard-to-observe tasks by sharing 
the gains, so workers have more incentive to devote effort to such tasks. Although time-rates do 
not reward employees for effort devoted to hard-to-observe tasks, the firm could still instruct the 
workers to do some hard-to-observe tasks or risk being fired, and since unlike piece rates 
workers are not rewarded for producing more output, they will follow the firm’s instruction and 








Proposition 3. When the firms switch from piece rates to gain sharing or time rates, the 
average ability of the workforce to produce higher quantity of output,  q A , decreases. 
When a firm switches from piece rates to gain sharing, the average ability of the 
workforce on hard-to-observe tasks,  e A , increases. When a firm switches from piece-
rates to time-rates, the average ability of the workforce on hard-to-observe tasks,  e A , 
does not change. 
The intuition behind this proposition is that the average ability of a firm’s employees to 
do observable tasks decreases, because gain-sharing and time-rates do not reward employees for 
producing large quantities. Since gain-sharing rewards employees for their performance on hard-11 
 
to-observe tasks, workers with greater ability to perform these tasks are attracted to the firm. 
Workers on time-rates do not get extra pay for performing well on these tasks, so employees’ 
ability to do hard-to-observe tasks will not change if a firm switches from time- to piece-rates. 
Proposition 4 Batch manufacturing with piece rates generates more production than does 
modern manufacturing with time rates or gain sharing. 
The intuition behind this proposition is that excessive production volume makes profits 
drop more quickly for modern manufacturers than for batch manufacturers, so the optimal 
production volume will be larger for batch manufactures than for modern manufactures. 
Proposition 5: If Just-In-Time and hard-to-observe tasks are valuable to a firm, when the 
firm switches from piece rates to gain-sharing or time-rates, the expected benefits 
increase. That is,  0 )] ~ , ( [ )] ˆ , ( [
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g  . 
This proposition is derived from Proposition 1 to Proposition 3. Proposition 1 states that 
time-rates and gain-sharing are better at making employees meet production targets than are  
piece-rates. The possible excessive or insufficient production volume due to piece-rates is very 
expensive for modern manufacturers. In addition, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that employee 
performance of hard-to-observe tasks, determined by abilities and effort, increases after switches 
from piece-rates to gain-sharing or time rates. Thus, with hard-to-observe task performance and 
Just-In-Time being valuable to modern manufactures, the production benefit function’s value 
will increase after switching away from piece rates. 
Proposition 6: When firms switch from piece rates to gain-sharing or time-rates, their 
labor costs remain the same or decrease. 
Under piece-rates, employers set the rate according to agents’ marginal monetary value 
of the disutility of producing the employer’s desired amount of output. That is, if the employer 12 
 
wants q ˆ amount of output, she will set the rate as ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 q e t t D   . So the total pay under piece-rate 
is  q t t D L q e p ˆ ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2  . But under time-rates and gain-sharing, to minimize costs, employers will set 
the labor cost as about equivalent with the agent’s monetary value of the total disutility of 
producingq ˆ . So the labor cost is ) ˆ , ˆ ( q e g t t t D L L   .  
The above rationale indicates that labor costs of time-rates or gain-sharing are not larger 
than that of piece-rates, because time-rates and gain-sharing are determined by worker’s total 
disutility, while piece rates are determined by worker’s marginal disutility, which is an 
increasing function of the amount of output. For example, suppose an agent’s disutility of 
producing the first piece of output is worth one dollar, and the disutility of producing the second 
piece is worth more, say two dollars. To make the worker produce two pieces, managers using 
time-rates and gain-sharing need to pay the agent only 1+2=3 dollars, but those using piece-rates 
will need to pay the worker 2 dollars per piece, for a  total  of 2*2=4 dollars. The rent the worker 
gains from time rates and gain sharing is 0, but the worker’s rent is strictly larger than zero, one 
dollar in this example, under piece-rates. 
Proposition 7: If Just-In-Time and hard-to-observe tasks are valuable to a firm, when 
firms switch from piece-rates to gain-sharing or time-rates, profits increase. 
Profits are determined by benefits and labor costs. According to Proposition 5, if JIT and 
hard-to-observe tasks are valuable to a firm, when the firm switches from piece rates to gain-
sharing or time-rates, the expected benefits increase 0 )] ~ , ( [ )] ˆ , ( [
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g . And according to Proposition 6, labor costs will not decrease 
when firms switches from piece rates to time rates, 
g p L L  and
t p L L  . Thus, it is straight 13 
 
forward to conclude that if JIT and hard-to-observe tasks are valuable, profits will increase after 
switching away from piece-rates 0 ) (
* *     p t E  and 0 ) (
* *     p g E . 
III. Empirical Analysis  
     Data Collection and Methods 
     In collecting our data, our method was consistent with the 5 steps of the “Insider 
Econometrics” approach described by Shaw (2009, p.615). First, we conducted multiple plant 
visits. At Big Foot we visited at least a dozen times between 1996 and 1998, and talked with at 
least 100 people, including top management, union presidents, and many workers on the 
assembly line. For Small Parts, we visited its Massachusetts plants in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 
2002. We also visited the Ohio and Florida plants each 3 times in 2002 and the UK plant in 2002 
and 2003. At each visit we spoke with managers and toured the plant.  In 2002, we conducted 
focus groups in each of these plants with workers (without management present). (See Freeman 
and Kleiner 2005 and Helper and Kleiner 2009 for more detail). Second, as a result of our plant 
visits, we identified the object of study as the impact on performance of changing methods of 
compensation. We treat the change in method of pay as exogenous to the workers, and identify 
variation in response based on worker ability and timing of the change in incentive systems 
(similar to Franceschelli, et al, 2010).  Management did not implement gain-sharing in all of its 
plants at once.  We suggest that the implementation process can be thought of as a quasi-natural 
experiment that can allow us to estimate the impacts of gain-sharing on both productivity and 
worker satisfaction. Third, we obtained detailed data from both companies, on financial reporting 
of what happened before, during, and after the change in the method of pay. Fourth, we used this 
data to test the predictions in our model. Fifth, we collected additional information from the 
workers themselves. At Big Foot, management gave us access to worker satisfaction surveys 14 
 
conducted before and after the change in the method of pay.  At Small Parts, we conducted 
anonymous surveys of employee attitudes. Management allowed us to conduct these surveys 
during work time (workers went to a separate training room where no managers were present); 
the response rates exceeded 90% in each plant. We also presented our findings to the 
management of each plant, and learned from their responses. 
   In this section, we use our data to test predictions from the models specified above.
8       
The two firms in our sample consisted of one with labor-intensive products (shoes) and one with 
capital-intensive products (auto parts). Figure 1 panel A, gives the time line for the change from 
the piece rate to the time rate method of pay for Big Foot, (BF) the labor-intensive firm in our 
analysis. In panel B we show the implementation of the policies for Small Parts using the same 
metrics.  
             The BF Shoe Company produces men’s work shoes and sports boots in two unionized 
plants in a small mid-western city. The firm sells much of its product through its own retail 
outlets, which makes it sensitive to service at the point of purchase and direct consumer response 
to its products. However, in 2003 the company agreed with Sears to sell its men’s work boots in 
all Sears retail outlets in the U.S., and it has agreements with national and international 
companies like J. Crew, to widely market its shoe and boot products. 
           In the mid 1980s the firm identified several problems that risked its survival in the face of 
foreign competition that was influencing the whole industry. The firm faced an inflexible 
production process; a huge work in-process and storage expenses and a demoralized piece rate 
compensation system. Consultants hired by the firm recommended that the firm try to create a 
niche market and introduce teamwork and continuous flow methods of production that required 
                                                 
8 Both firms in our analysis agreed to let us use confidential internal documents if we did not use the name of the 
firm in our publications.  Replication is allowed if a nondisclosure agreement is signed.  15 
 
employees to know many different tasks, warning that unless the firm lowered its costs, most of 
which were labor costs, it was unlikely to survive. Management thought that the company’s 
piece rate system was a barrier to making the necessary changes in production. The union was 
willing to go along with these policies so that the firm could remain viable. 
             The system of production made it difficult to introduce more styles and produce the 
higher quality products that offered a chance of survival in the face of low wage foreign 
competition.  BF introduced a continuous flow mode of manufacturing (CFM) and changed from 
a piece rate to a time rate mode of compensation.  The firm developed many new lines of shoes 
based on market demand, a modular form of production in which workers were cross-trained to 
cut days in-process,  used a just-in time method of supplying materials to the lines, and thus was 
able to deliver “hot sellers” in a more rapid manner. The firm began to implement the new 
process in April 1990 in one factory, but it took roughly two and one-half years before all the 
plant’s lines shifted to the continuous flow mode.   
Making the transformation was difficult.  Many supervisors did not support the CFM 
initiative and some actively worked against it because it meant a reduction in supervisory and 
inspection jobs.  In fact, the firm eliminated six intermediate inspector jobs in each plant when it 
went to Continuous Flow Manufacturing.   Thirty-three percent of the company’s supervisors 
and a number of senior managers took early retirement.  Many production workers feared the 
loss of seniority, job rights, and reduced pay. Big Foot negotiated a lower hourly wage system 
for new hires but agreed to “red circle” the wages of all current production workers. That is, the 
firm would base current workers’ new hourly wage on their piece rate earnings in the future 
based on output for the 26 weeks previous to their department’s shift to CFM.    16 
 
The firm had other problems in making the transition to continuous flow manufacturing.  
Failing to anticipate that productivity would fall sharply with the move to time rates, 
management had to schedule its production workers for as much as 10 hours’overtime work per 
week.  On the other hand, following the transition in managerial policies, there was a dramatic 
drop in union grievances and in worker compensation costs.   And BF increased the number of 
shoe styles from 106 in 1985 to 187 in 1996, more than doubling the number of new styles 
introduced per year from six during the piece rate regime to 13 in the time rate regime. From 
1990 to 1997, the percentage of shoe sales due to the top 10 styles dropped by 20% as new styles 
took a larger part of sales. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, Big Foot’s managerial operations and 
pay for workers were different than at the outset of the decade.  Labor costs were considerably 
lower.  Thus the impact of Big Foot’s change in compensation policy cannot be determined in 
isolation from the firm’s other policies.  
The other firm in our sample, Small Parts (SP), produces switches and actuators for firms 
in the auto industry. SP initially was a low-volume operation where quality requirements were 
not high, and where designs were generally dictated by the customer and did not change often.  
The older jobs were individually paced, and consisted of a single worker sitting at a machine. 
She would add one or more pieces to a small assembly and then press a button or foot pedal to 
fasten the piece via welding or crimping. She would then place the partially-completed product 
in a box; when the box was full, material handlers would move it to workers who would do the 
next stage. During our 1995 visit we watched several of these piece-rate workers, and were 
impressed by the workers’ speed and intensity of focus. 
  In 1987, the firm began a major change in its product market strategy, and by the late 
1990s it designed almost all of its own products (which are complex assemblies of plastic and 17 
 
electronic parts) and modified them frequently (50 in a typical year under the new strategy), 
rather than producing individual electronic components to customer blueprints. The company 
also increased its quality levels and reduced its inventory..These changes were common in the 
industry, and resulted from pressure from the firm’s major customers, such as Ford and General 
Motors.   
  As a result of these product-market changes, the firm introduced changes in its 
operations. Management gradually brought in more automated assembly, eliminating 
individually-paced jobs. Instead, 6-8 workers sat around a circular work cell. Some stations were 
completely automated; at most stations a worker assisted the machine in assembling the part. 
When the part was finished, it would be moved (automatically or manually) to the next station. 
At the last station, the operator would pack the fully-completed part into a box to be shipped 
directly to the customer. The cell was paced by the slowest worker. At many of the cells, a 
lighted overhead sign kept track of the pieces made, and compared it to the pieces that should be 
made to meet the day’s quota.  Since there was no buffer between operators, inventory in the 
cells was dramatically lower (and lead times faster) than under piece rates. 
By 2000, these assembly jobs employed the bulk of the work force in a highly capital-
intensive method of production (Helper & Kleiner, 2009). Labor costs were less than 10 percent 
of total production costs.  The move in this firm was to modern manufacturing from batch 
production. The firm’s new strategy was not consistent with SP’s existing pay practices, which 
involved piece rates for operators and assemblers. As our theory suggests, piece rates led to 
problems with hard to observe tasks such as minimizing inventory, difficulty in changing to new 
products, and problems in encouraging teamwork.  A particular problem was new product 
introduction. As SP’s controller put it in a document she wrote for us in 2000,  18 
 
“New product development became a hurdle with the piecework system. Employees did 
not want to work on new product [because they would have to learn a new job, with the risk of 
lower pay while they figured out shortcuts]…There were no good standards for new product and 
there was no way to introduce new products unless we wanted to throw loose rates on them. This 
restricted us from doing new products.”  
 
As this quote illustrates, setting the rate on a new product took a long time and was 
fraught with conflict and risk for both parties, even in a nonunion setting such as SP.  
SP Managers were concerned that time rates alone would not provide enough incentive to 
avoid wasteful inventory, prevent defects, or promote incremental improvement. As a result, the 
firm implemented a gain-sharing method of pay. The principle behind the value-added gain-
sharing program was to give workers as a group a stake in their plant’s performance. The details 
of the plan changed over the years; initially, the size of the bonus pool was a function only of 
factors that management felt workers could influence: productivity increases, defect rates, and 
customer satisfaction. In the plants formerly on piece rates, most, production workers’ 
compensation fell significantly (though workers’ reported effort also fell); in some former time-
rate plants compensation increased slightly. We present information on the dates of the 
movement away from piece rates and the introduction of the value-added gain sharing plan 
(VAG) in Figure 2 in panel B. 
Empirical Results 
In Table 1 we show summary statistics for the two firms in our sample. Our efforts to 
isolate the impact of gain sharing on productivity and satisfaction involve two types of tests. We 
examine the direct impact of the transformation on performance, using measures of productivity, 
costs, and profitability. Next, we measure the impact of the changes away from piece rates on 
employee attitudes toward performing hard-to-observe tasks at work.  
  Our basic models for estimation are of the following form: 19 
 
(A) Q = f(K, Change, X`, ε), where  
Q is productivity as measured by output or value added per worker, 
Change is 0 for each month until the VAG or time rate program is introduced in that plant, and 1 
afterward, X` is a set of controls for plant and individual characteristics, and ε is the error term, 
with the usual ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions on its structure. 
In table 2, we estimate the impact of the switch away from piece rates on performance  
for both observable tasks (production) and hard-to-observe tasks (minimizing material costs). In 
panel A, we look at the impact for BF, controlling for 1) the transition period during which some 
but not all lines, had changed away from piece rates (“transition effect”), 2) the 26-week period 
during which employees could lock in a future time wage that depended on their piece-rate 
earnings during this period, an arrangement which created a powerful incentive for BF workers 
to work very hard during the period (“full effort effect”).
9 We control for headcount, and also for 
time trend. We use material costs as a proxy for firms’ success in incentivizing workers to 
perform hard to observe tasks. Our rationale is that the main ways to reduce material costs for a 
given amount of output are to improve quality and reduce inventory—both hard to observe 
activities, as we argued above.  
 In Panel B, we look at the same outcomes for SP. Our control variables are slightly 
different, as SP moved away from piece rates without a transition or ‘full effort” period.  In this 
table we include data only at the Boston plant, which is the only SP plant for which we have data 
before and after a move from piece rates to VAG.  Our measure of productivity for SP is Value 
                                                 
9 The dummy variable used to proxy for full effort isolates the period when the firm told workers that their 
productivity would determine pay for the duration of their employment; the implication is that under normal piece 
rates, productivity is below the productivity that workers reach by giving their full effort. Our ability to talk to 
managers and workers in each plant  allowed us to identify the dates of the implementation of the transition and full 
effort periods. (Helper, 2000). 20 
 
Added = Net Sales – Material Cost – Labor Cost. We also include production worker headcount, 
a monthly time trend. 
  Our estimates in Table 2, column 1, show that the coefficient on “change”, the variable 
capturing the move away from piece rates, is negative and significant in each of the productivity 
regressions.  That is, overall output per person declined in both companies after the move away 
from piece rates. This result is consistent with our Proposition 4, that a move away from piece 
rates should lead to reduced performance on observable tasks. The result is also consistent with 
previous work on piece rates that examines only performance on observable tasks, such as 
Lazear and Franceschelli et al (2010).  However, consistent with our multitask model; our data 
suggests that effort on hard-to-observe tasks increased.  For example, material use declined; this 
suggests workers worked harder to minimize waste. In contrast, under piece rates, workers want 
to have as much material as possible available in order to produce additional units of output and 
maximize pay
10. 
Data from BF in Table 3 allow us to analyze Proposition 1, that planned output is closer 
to actual output when the firm moves away from piece rates.
11  Planned output was estimated on 
a monthly basis by the engineers, with input from the sales force usually one year in advance. 
Using Equation (A), we examine the difference in planned output relative to actual output, before 
and after the change to time rates. The focal independent variable “change” is coded as 0 before 
switching from time rates and 1 after the changes. Similar to Table 2, we also controlled for total 
headcount, plant fixed effects, transition effect, and full effort effect in the estimation. We find 
that the transition to time rates was associated with a significant reduction in the gap between 
                                                 
10 Note that although it is possible for the econometrician (and thus also the manager) to measure material costs in 
aggregate, that does not mean it is possible to construct an individual incentive to minimize material costs. For 
example, if extra material is used due to poor quality, there may be fights about whose fault the defect was. 
Alternatively, teamwork may be necessary to identify causes and propose solutions that lead to reduced scrap rates. 
11 Unfortunately, no such metric existed for SP.  21 
 
actual production and planned production, which allowed the firm to better meet its production 
targets. The data in Appendix B also shows that planned production volume declined after the 
change to time rates.  
In Table 4 we show the determinants of workers’ self-reported productivity and effort on 
hard-to-observe tasks. The analysis examines Proposition 3, which analyzes the selection effects 
of the transformation away from piece rates. Our basic model is : 
(B) Coop =f (VAG, X`, ε),  
where employee attitudes toward cooperation with management goals ( Coop) is a function of 
whether the employee was hired after the implementation of value added gain sharing (VAG) and 
plant characteristics X`, and the ε is the error term. 
As measures of employee attitudes, we asked workers about meeting production targets, 
teamwork, suggestions, and overall satisfaction. We used a standard survey instrument, the 
Minnesota Satisfaction Survey (MSS) to examine employee satisfaction. The MSS has been used 
by industrial psychologists for more than 50 years to gauge employee satisfaction in American 
industry.  The questions were of a Likert-type 5-point scale. We also asked the employees about 
their tenure with the company, type of job, and pay policies. 
  At the Boston plant, we were able to gather more detailed information on the 
characteristics of employees. A high percentage of the employees were immigrants from 
Vietnam and Cape Verde, and were not proficient in English. Consequently, we translated our 
questionnaire into Vietnamese and Portuguese;
12 respondents chose the language in which they 
wanted to take the survey. Thus, we are able to differentiate individuals in the plant by their 
degree of assimilation to English.  
                                                 
12 The Cape Verdeans spoke several dialects of Portuguese.  22 
 
The estimates are shown in Table 4 for SP, and although the results are not significant, 
the coefficients’ directions are consistent with Proposition 3, that a transformation in the method 
of pay leads to the selection of workers with different characteristics, consistent with Lazear 
(2000).
13 For example, workers hired after the transition occurred at their plant perceive 
themselves as being less productive, which is consistent with the findings in Table 2 that show 
productivity going down in SP following the transformation, and with Proposition 4, which 
shows that part of the reason for the productivity decline is that new workers are less able to 
perform easy to observe tasks. By contrast, the effects on teamwork, suggestions, and overall 
satisfaction are all positive although not precisely estimated. The estimates are consistent with 
Proposition 3, that new workers will have higher aptitude for teamwork and unobservable tasks 
relative to employees that were hired during the piece-rate era. Since satisfaction is closely 
linked in the human resource literature to turnover and other measures of firm performance, 
maintaining satisfaction when large changes occur in the firm is an important concern for 
employers (Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001).  
 As both Tables 3 and 4 show, the transition away from piece rates significantly improved 
the ability of the firm to hit its target production rather than just produce more units.   
Tables 5 shows a test of Proposition 6 that labor should be reduced or remain the same 
when the transition occurs away from piece rates. The results for both firms are consistent with 
the prediction. These results suggest that the wage-effort bargain for production workers in these 
two plants shifted from a focus on a large amount of output at high total effort to providing more 
                                                 
13 In Appendix Table, we also show the overall satisfaction changes in BF before, during, and after the change to 
time rates. The results show initial high levels of satisfaction, and then a decline as the firm changed, and then a 
return to a level similar to that which occurred prior to the change (the last measure was taken by another firm which 
used a different survey instrument and measure of satisfaction).  23 
 
hard-to-observe input and working together to produce what was required at a point in time, with  
lower total effort required.    
        Finally, Figure 3 and Table 6 tests Proposition 7 on profitability for both firms separately 
and together with controls for firm fixed effects. Figure 3 shows the before and after changes in 
compensation and profitability in both BF and SP.  In both cases there is a trend upward 
following the transformation.  In the left part of panel A, we show the influence of the change in 
method of pay on profitability at BF. The results show that the change enhanced profitability at 
BF by a statistically significant 18 percent. In the right part of panel A, we show only the results 
for the Boston plant of SP, which moved from piece rates to gain sharing. This plant most 
closely resembles BF.  Consistent with our other findings we show a significant increase in 
profits of about 21 percent as a result of the change to gain-sharing from piece rates. 
Next, in order to provide a sensitivity analysis we included all of the plants of Small Parts 
to show the influence of being in either a gain-sharing or time rates method of pay for SP and 
BF, , on profits. In contrast to the previous estimation, now we include all of the four SP plants, 
some of which did not change their compensation methods. During the period of our study, the 
Boston plant shifted from piece rates to gain sharing, the Florida plant shifted from time rates to 
gain sharing, the Ohio plant remained on time rates, and the UK plant remained on piece rates. 
This specification allows us to use the plants as controls for each other.
14 We used two 
estimation methods to test the effects of time rates and gain sharing: one is the same as the 
specification in Table 2 and Table 6, Panel A
15; the other  is to include the lagged value of profits 
                                                 
14 The four plants had remarkably similar production processes during the period of our study. However, Boston also 
had a large product design function, which designed products for other plants as well. To control for this difference, 
we included the percent of non-production employees in the plant.  
15 We did not include the interaction terms between time trend and compensation method, because this represents a 
different meaning from the interaction terms  between time trend and changes, which capture s the changes  in the 
slopes of the estimates. 24 
 
(i.e. the lagged value of the dependent variable) to capture the time effect. The results of both  
estimation approaches  are similar. In Table 6 panel B we show the results of the latter 
specification. Having gain-sharing raises profitability by about 39 percent and it is precisely 
estimated relative to piece rates. Paying by time rates is also associated with higher profitability  
by a marginally significant 34 percent relative to piece rates.   
Although wed do not present the estimates in the Tables,, we also combined these data 
for SP and BF, and found that moving away from piece rates to a method of compensation where 
individual based incentive is substantially reduced, along with other changes consistent with 
“modern manufacturing,” substantially enhanced the profitability of the firms in our sample. The 
change in the method of compensation was associated with an increase in profitability of 
approximately 16 percent.  
IV. Conclusions 
The economics of optimal incentives suggest that methods of pay should be different in 
different production environments. Following Lazear, we initially develop the case where 
workers produce one product and an owner monitors and receives profits; in this case the optimal 
incentive system is piece rates. Under this form of compensation, workers receive pay based on 
the quantity and quality of the output produced. Assuming an efficient allocation of the wages 
and profits, workers will receive their marginal product and owners will receive normal profits. 
In modern manufacturing, hard-to-observe tasks like teamwork, planning, decision 
making, and problem solving are required, which result in other types of compensation systems 
being potentially optimal. For example, time rates and gain sharing, where no or only a small 
amount of pay is variable, may result in optimal output and satisfaction for the workforce. We 
provide evidence from six establishments within  two firms who changed from a piece rate 25 
 
method of pay to either time rates or gain sharing. Both our theoretical and empirical analyses 
suggest that moving away from piece-rate methods of pay for performance may enhance profits 
in both of the cases we examined. Further, changes for production workers away from piece rates 
enhance the new workers’ attitudes toward teamwork and collaboration. These results suggest 
one reason why firms may have chosen over the past 50 years to largely abandon piece rate 
methods of pay in favor of time rates or gain sharing. Our analysis thus shows the importance of 
distinguishing types of incentive pay: we find that firm profitability under modern manufacturing 
is consistent with either group incentive pay (such as gain-sharing), or no incentives (such as 
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Figure 1. Impacts of modern manufacturing on optimal compensation 
 
Feature of modern 
manufacturing  
impact on production function
 
desirability of piece rates 
Increased emphasis 
on: 
Increased return to: 
 
Reduced due to: 
Quality  effort on hard-to-observe tasks, 
such as suggestions for process 
improvement 
low motivation to develop, 




  multi-tasking 
(workers use observation gained 




Product Variety  effort on hard-to-observe tasks 
such as de-bugging process for 
new products 
fights, risk in establishing 
rates on new products 
 
 
  multi-tasking (complex scheduling 
increases return to workers who 
can produce multiple products, do 
both set-ups and production) 
 
difficulty of establishing 
rate that gives workers an 
incentive to switch to the 
task that is most highly 
valued at that moment 
 
JIT production  producing exact quantity 
demanded 
low return to extra 
production incentivized by 
piece rate 
 
  multi-tasking due to increased 
return to speedy problem-solving; 
Lack of space on line; lack of time 
for specialized workers to learn 
about problems 
 
low effort on hard to 
observe tasks that increase 
quality 
 
difficulty in valuing 
individual contribution to 
process improvements, 




Figure 2: The timing of the movement away from piece rates in the manufacturing 
establishments 
Panel A  Big Foot  
 
Panel B Small Parts 
 31 
 
Figure 3: Profits over time 
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Note: The estimation specification of the predicted value is log_grossprofit =f(log_assets, time, 
vag, vag*time, log_headcount, fixed effects) 32 
 
  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Explanation of Variables 
 
  Big Foot  Small Parts 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD 














$5221.37 1449.33 $6131.57  2408.71 
Net sales per 
production 
worker 
$13524.3 3412.752  $14042.16  3730.19 
Production 








4107.038 1076.775  N/A  N/A 
Value added 
profit  $2,324,016 1058492 $5,878,878  2478649 
Number of 
Observations  290 127 
  Notes: net sales, labor cost, material cost and total asset are in dollars; Monthly data; 
 
Change  Coded as zero when the data points’ periods are under piece rates; coded as 1 when the 
data points’ periods are under gain sharing or time rates. 
Headcount Number  of  manufacturing workers 
Asset  Asset of Small Part 
Labor Cost  Compensation costs 
Material 
Costs 
Variable production costs 
Transition 
Effects 
It is a period at Big Foot prior to the complete transformation. In the period, part of the 
plants changed to time rates, while other part of the plants remains in piece rates. 
Full Effort 
Effects 
It is period at Big Foot during the transition where workers maximized their effort 
hoping for a higher time rate during their entire employment at BF. 
Time  Time trend: 1, 2, 3,…, n for monthly data. For Small Parts, n = 98, and Time = 47 is the 
implementation of gain sharing. For Big Foot, n = 140, and Time = 102 is the full 
implementation of time rates for Plant 1, Time = 90 is the full implementation of time 
rates for Plant 2. 33 
 
Sales  Income from sales 
Production  Production volumes in thousands of dollars for Small Parts 
Pairs  For BF, pairs of shoes produced 
Gap  The difference between the planned pairs of shoes to be produced and the actual pairs of 
shoes produced 
Self-ranking 

















From the employee survey of Small Parts: “Considering everything, how satisfied are 











Table 2 Analyzing observable and unobservable tasks in manufacturing 
 
Panel A. Big Foot (BF); change from piece rates to time rates 
Dependent 
Variable 










pair of shoes) 
Change  -.20** (.02)  -.23** (.06)  -.19** (.07)  -.16* (.08) 
Change*time  .0008 (.0007)  .0004 (.0016)  -.001 (.002)  -.003 (.002) 
Time  .0002 (.0002)  .005** (.001)  .007 (.0008)  .002* (.0009) 
Log headcount  .92** (.02)  .91** (.05)  .03 (.06)  .04 (.07) 
Transition 
effect  -.07** (.02)  -.07 (.05)  -.004 (.06)  .02 (.07) 
Full effort 
effect  .0003 (.02)  .008 (.04)  .06 (.05)  .02 (.06) 
Constant  2.82** (.12)  9.65** (.28)  5.49** (.36)  1.69** (.41) 
Adjusted R-
squared  .94 .81 .48 .06 
Number of 
observation  240 247 240 238 
 
Panel B. Small Parts (SP); change from piece rates to gain sharing 
Dependent 
Variable 
Sales Volume  Hard-to–Observe Tasks 
Ln(production)  Ln(percentage of material cost in 
production) 
Change  -.62** (.16)  -.14* (.07) 
Change*time  .01** (.003)  .003 (.002) 
Time  -.010** (.003)  -.002 (.002) 
Log headcount  1.46** (.25)  1.05** (.12) 
Log asset  1.42** (.40)  -.35† (.20) 
Constant  -15.34** (3.69)  -3.68* (1.83) 
Adjusted R-
squared  .96 .88 
Number of 
observation  98 98 
Empirical Test of Proposition 4 and Proposition 2-3 
Source: Based on company’s data. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes: Time is a monthly time trend. The results are similar with or without polynomial 






Big Foot: Effect of compensation system changes on the gap between planned output and 
actual output 
Change -.03**  (.01) 
Total headcount  .0001* (.00005) 
Transition effect  -.03** (.01) 
Full Effort effect  .06** (.01) 
Constant -.04*  (.02) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.13 
N            240 
Empirical Test of Proposition 1 
Source: Based on company’s data. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes: Regression includes a plant dummy to account for fixed effects.  






Small Parts: Comparing employee perceptions on work for those hired before and after gain sharing Small 
Dependent  
Variables 
Production Volume  Hard-to-Observe Tasks  General 
job 
satisfaction
Self-ranking of success at 








-.11  .28† .26 .18 
(.11) (.16)  (.16)  (.12) 
Vietnamese 
 
-.23† .13 .13  .38** 
(.13) (.19)  (.19)  (.14) 
Cape Verde 
 
-.35** .03  -.13  .17 
(.13) (.19)  (.19)  (.14) 
Constant 
 
3.60**  3.26** 3.00**  3.04** 
(.10) (.15)  (.16)  (.12) 
Adjusted R- 0.02 .002  .005  .02 
N    428  439  422  478 
Empirical Test of Proposition 3 
Source: Based on survey data. Standard errors are in parentheses.  




Table 5  
 
Labor costs and changes in compensation  
Regression estimates of the effects of compensation method changes on labor costs 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln (labor costs per 
employee) 
Big Foot  Small Parts 
Change  -.24 (.23)  -.71* (.28) 
Change*time  -.002 (.002)  .007 (.004) 
Time  .006** (.001)  -.007 (.004) 
Log asset  N/A  1.49** (.40) 
Transition effect  -.10 (.06)  N/A 
Full effort effect  .17** (.05)  N/A 
Constant  7.33 (.33)  -16.86 (4.42) 
R-squared 0.33  0.27 
Number of Observation  247  99 
Empirical test of Proposition 6 
Source: Based on company data. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
* Big Foot regression includes a plant dummy to separately account for the performance 






Panel A: Profitability and changes in compensation  
Regression estimates of the effects of compensation method changes on profitability 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln (gross profit per 
employee) 
Big Foot  Small Parts 
Change  .18** (.07)  .21* (.11) 
Change*time  .005** (.002)  -.003** (.001) 
Time  -.003** (.001)  .002* (.001) 
Log headcount  -.04 (.058)  -.76** (.09) 
Log asset  N/A  .26† (.15) 
Transition effect  .03 (.06)  N/A 
Full effort effect  -.07 (.05)  N/A 
Constant  -.47 (.33)  1.24 (1.37) 
R-squared 0.26  0.87 
Number of Observation  247  98 
 
Panel B: Effects of time rates and gain sharing 
Regression estimates of the effects of compensation methods in profitability 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln (gross profit per 
employee) 
Big Foot  Small Parts 
Gain Sharing  N/A  .39** (.06) 
Time Rates  .18** (.05)  .34** (.14) 
Log asset per employee  N/A  -.02 (.04) 
DV of the previous 
month  .11† (.06)  .22** (.06) 
Percentage of non-
production employees  N/A .06**  (.01) 
Transition effect  .03 (.07)  N/A 
Full effort effect  -.04 (.07)  N/A 
Constant  7.57** (.55)  -.62* (.27) 
R-squared 0.24  0.85 
Number of Observation  245  263 
Empirical test of Proposition 7 
Source: Based on company data. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notes: Gross profit is equal to the income that the companies have after subtracting 
material cost and labor cost.. † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
* Big Foot regression includes a plant dummy to separately account for the performance 
of each of BF’s two plants. 
* Small Parts regression in Panel B includes dummies to account for the fixed effects of 
different plants located in Boston, Ohio, Florida, and U.K. 39 
 
Appendix A: Trends in job satisfaction at Big Foot 
 
Employee Satisfaction Before, During and After the Transition from Piece Rates to Time Rates 
 1992 
Before the Change 
1993 
During the Change 
1995 

























































Yes%  53 30  69  27 70  30  42 50  49   
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Appendix B:  Descriptive statistics of before and after changes in compensation methods 
  Big Foot  Small Parts 
 Before  After  Before  After 
               
  Mean SD  Mean  SD Mean SD  Mean  SD 



















$13235.48  3102.74 $14354.63* 4093.29  $11,086.78  2074.03 $17054.38** 2379.13 
Production 








4110.396  1063.508 4096.5  1126.854 N/A  N/A N/A N/A 
Profit $2,143,315 962667.6 $2,851,777  1153345  $3,499,478  792340.7 $7,983,731**  1227749 
Number of 
Observations  169 96  75  52 
Notes: net sales, labor cost, material cost and total asset are in dollars; Monthly data; † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, two-tailed. 41 
 
Appendix C:  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Since we are not dealing with the hard-to-observe tasks here, we will simplify the 
firms’ problem to  L q B    ) (  for convenience. 
Time Rates and Gain Sharing 
The firm asks the agent to produce the optimal volume q ˆ . If output consistently 
falls short of the principal’s expectation, the principal will hire extra workers or replace 
the low-performance worker with a new worker to make sure the workforce will always 
produce the desired output. Thus we have  0 | ˆ |  q q  . 
Piece Rates. In contrast to time rates or gain sharing, the principal does not 
directly tell the agent how many to produce, but instead announces a piece rate,  , to the 
agent who chooses q  to maximize his utility,  ) , ( *   q D q  . The term  ) , (  q D is the 
monetary value of the agent’s disutility of producing q pieces, with  0 ) , ( 1   q D  
and 0 ) , ( 11   q D . The variable   is a random variable representing the uncertainty of the 
disutility function with the expectation of its distribution being zero. The variable   
comes from the information asymmetry between the principal and agent and frequent 
changes of product design. The more frequently the product designs change, the more 
uncertain the principal is about how much effort the agent needs to make to produce the 
commodity. Thus, the standard deviation of the distribution of   is large.  
The agent’s maximization yields the first-order condition  ) , ~ ( 1   q D   from 
which we deduce a reaction function  ) , (   h . This satisfies  ) ), , ~ ( ( 1     h D  . 
The optimal piece rate announcement to the agent is obtained from maximizing 42 
 
)] , ( * )) , ( ( [     
 h h B E Max   
i.e. 
)] , ~ ( ~ ) , ~ ( [ )] , ~ ( )) , ~ ( ( [ 1 1 1          h h E h h B E    . 
We obtain: 
)] , ~ ( [




     

h E
h h h B E 
 , and the agent will respond with 
) , ~ ( ~   h q  , which is transmitted to the principal. Notice that q ~ is a function of the 
random variable   both directly and indirectly via  ~. Thus, q ~ deviates from its optimal 
value ) ~ (q E , i.e.,  0 | ) ( | | ˆ ~ | | ) ~ ( ~ |       f q q q E q .  
Transition from piece-rates to time-rates and gain-sharing: Switching from piece-
rates makes the firms better able to produce the exact optimal volume, because 
| ˆ ~ | 0 | ˆ | q q q q      . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
To investigate how piece-rates affect the agent’s effort, we set the agent’s utility 
function as  ) , ( )
) , (
)( ( q e q e t t D
N
q e B
t t p U    

  . To maximize the utility function, 
the agent chooses  * e t  and  * q t  to satisfy the first order condition: 
0 )) ( *)( ( )
) , (
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Switching from piece-rates to time-rates 
By contrasting the disutility functions, we can contrast the effort allocation under 


















    ) ( *) ( * *) ( ' 2 2 1 1     
The firm will set the piece rate as  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ 2 q e t t D   , so that the workers will devote 
the desired amount of effort  q tˆ and produce the exact quantity of q ˆ . Under time-rates and 
gain-sharing, the firms simply require the workers to produce q ˆ . Since it is an observable 
task, the workers will risk being laid off if they consistently do not reach the target q ˆ . 
Thus,  0 2 2 2 2    
g p t p D D D D  
The above equation indicates that workers’ effort on hard-to-observe tasks are 
determined by the piece rate ( ), the extent to which a worker’s effort can be observed  








which is negative. When the effort on hard-to-observe tasks is very hard to observe, 
(i.e. 0 ) ( '  e t p , 1 ) (  e t p ) and  is large,  0 1 1  
p t D D  becomes positive, which 
indicate that the effort on observable tasks decreases and the effort on hard-to-observe 
tasks increases. 44 
 
































    ) ( *) ( * *) ( ' ) ( *) (
) , (
*) ( ' 2 2 2 1 1 1  
 
 
Similar to the situation of switching to time-rates, when tasks become hard to 
observe, (i.e. 0 ) ( '  e t p  and  1 ) (  e t p ),  0 1 1  
p g D D  is positive, which indicates that 
the effort devoted to hard-to-observe tasks increases when a firm switches from piece 
rates to time rates. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
For simplicity, we assume hard-to-observe tasks are completely unobservable 
(i.e. 1 ) (  e t p ) hereafter, unless otherwise mentioned. 
Piece Rates. An agent’s utility under piece rates is  ) , ( q e q p t t D q U      . 






















































 , which is greater 









. The equation shows that two components contribute to the 
benefit of being fast in producing commodities under piece-rates: higher incomes and 
lower disutility. 







.  45 
 
Gain Sharing. An agent’s utility under gain sharing is 
) , (
) , (
q e g t t D
N
q e B
U      . The variables eandq are functions of the agent’s ability 
(denoted as  e A  and  q A ) and effort (denoted as  e t  and  q t ).  ) , ( e e A t e e    ) , ( q q A t q q  .  
As before, sinceq’s outcome can be easily measured, the principal imposes a rule 
of  q q ˆ  to agents.
16 To minimize the pain associated with effort, an agent will produce a 
volume of commodities such that  q q ˆ
*  , with 
*
q t  being the optimal level of effort 









































 with  g U
*  being the optimal utility 






















































































Time Rates. An agent’s utility under gain sharing is  ) , ( q e t t t D U    . Similar to 
the case of gain sharing, there is a weak sorting effect in terms of simple tasks because to 
minimize the pain associated with effort devoted to simple tasks, an agent will produce an 
outcome such that  q q ˆ
* , so  q A t q q q ˆ ) , (
* *  with 
*
q t  being the optimal level of effort 
devoted to produce the required quantities of commodities. Given this implicit function, it 
                                                 
16 Zero is the minimum performance standard required by the principal for the observable tasks. If the 
agents cannot meet the standard, they will be dismissed.   46 
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*  being the 







































Because the wage under time rates does not depend on the ability to perform hard-
to-observe tasks, and the ability to perform hard-to-observe tasks does not influence an 








Transition from Piece Rates to Time Rates/Gain Sharing. From these results, we 
can see that all of the compensation schemes have sorting effects in terms of abilities to 
produce certain volumes of commodities quickly. But the sorting effect of piece-rates is 
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17. The intuition behind this is that under piece rates, in 






















 ) from being competent to produce more.  
                                                 
17 To prove this inequality: according to Proposition 1a,  qt qg qp t t t










































, but the sorting effects will remain the same if the firm 













Proof of Proposition 4 
For simplicity, we assume that agent’s abilities are the same under the three 
compensation schemes.
18   
In the batch manufacturing mode with a piece-rate compensation scheme, a 
simplified profit function of a firm is  q q e B
batch       ) , ( , subject to the 
maximization of a worker’s utility function   ) , ( q e t t D q U       and the constraint 
0 ) , (    q e t t D q   , which makes the worker willing to join the firm. Substituting the 
constraint to the profit function yields  ) , ( ) , ( q e
batch t t D q e B    , with the first order 








D q B . The maximization of the worker’s utility 
function yields the first order condition    2 D . The two first order conditions imply that 
*) ( 2 q B
batch   . Thus  *) ( *) ( 2 2 q B q D
batch  . Suppose  0 22 
batch B  to be a constant. 
q B B B
batch batch batch
22 2 2 ) 0 (   . For simplicity, we assume 0 22  D  as a constant. The optimal 






2 ) 0 (
*

 .  
                                                 
18 Note that if we include the change in abilities (i.e. sorting effects), the results of Proposition 4 and 
Proposition 2 will be strengthened.  For Proposition 2,  22 D  and for Proposition 4, 
t p D D 2 2   and 
p p D D 2 2  characterize how sorting effects help strengthen the results of the two propositions. 48 
 
In the modern manufacturing mode with time rates and gain sharing, the firm’s 
profit function is        ) , ( ) 1 (
mod q e B . The maximization of the profit function 
yields 0 ) 1 (
mod





 . Since the percentage of benefit shared with workers is less 
than 100% (i.e.  1   ), the optimal production volume satisfies 0 ) ˆ (
mod
2  q B , with q ˆ  
being the optimal production volume in modern manufacturing. Since 0
mod
22  B  is a 




2 2   . Thus,.  mod
22
mod




















   
Because of the frequent change in product designs and the costs associated with 
excessive inventory, one characteristic of modern manufacturing is that  0
mod
22  B  is much 
smaller than  0 22 
batch B , because excessive production volume makes profits drop more 













batch   , the production volume  under batch manufacturing and 
piece rates is larger than under modern manufacturing with time rates or gain-sharing.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Following the proof for Proposition 1, to obtain analytical results, we 
approximate costs and benefits with a quadratic approximation around q ˆ . 
2 ) ˆ ~ (
2
) ˆ ( ' '
) ˆ ~ )( ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ( ) ~ ( q q
q B
q q q B q B q B       49 
 
After some manipulation, we 
have ] ) ˆ ~ [( )
2
( ) ( ) (
2 22 * * * * q q E
B
B B E B B E p g p t 

      
Notice that the two parts consist of the difference between the quantity produced in piece 
rates and the quantity produced in time rates/gain sharing:  ] ˆ ) ~ ( [ )] ~ ( ~ [ ˆ ~ q q E q E q q q      .  
The gap between the actual production and the optimal production volume will be 
influenced by the uncertainty,  , i.e.,  ) ( ) ~ ( ~     q E q  with  0 )] ( [    E . Let us denote: 
] ) ( [
2 2   E s  . Then we have: 
] ) ˆ ) ~ ( ( )[
2
( ) ( ) (
2 2 22 * * * * q q E E s
B
B B E B B E p g p t  

     





, which is greater than zero 
( 0 22  B ) and thus means that switching to time rates or gain sharing will always cause 
the firm’s actual output to be closer to its optimal output.  
Following the proof for Proposition 2 and 3, we conclude that the outcomes of  
hard-to-observe tasks, determined by te and Ae, are strictly larger under gain sharing and 


































t A t e A t e  . Also, although piece rates produce 
















q A A t t   & , these increased abilities and effort at observable tasks brings no 
additional income when they exceed the optimal quantity q ˆ  (i.e.  0 ) , ( 2  q e B  for  q q ˆ  ). 
Thus, the net income of gain sharing/time rates will be strictly larger than the net income 50 
 
under piece rates (i.e., 
* *
p g B B   and
* *
p t B B  ), because time rates and gain-sharing 
yield increased performance on the hard-to-observe task (i.e.  0 ) , ( 1  q e B  for all e). The 
combination of this result and the above result of Proposition 1 indicates that 
0 )] ~ , ( [ )] ˆ , ( [





0 )] ~ , ( [ )] ˆ , ( [





Proof of Proposition 6:  
To minimize costs, the compensation paid byfirms under gain sharing and time 
rates (i.e. t L  and  g L ) will be set equal to the disutility of effort, that  is, 
) ˆ , ˆ ( q e g t t t D L L   , and  T t t p e   ˆ ˆ , with T being the total time at work.  By contrast, to 
motivate the employees to devote the desired level of effort, the piece rate is set as the 
marginal disutility of effort, that is,  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 q e t t D   . Since the marginal disutility increases 
as the firms’ required effort increases, (i.e.  0 22  D ), piece rates generate more pay for 










q t D dt t t D dt t t D t D
q q
     , with  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 q e t t D being a 
constant while  ) , ˆ ( 2 q e t t D  being an increasing function of  q t . This indicates that the labor 
cost for doing observable tasks under piece rates is higher than that of time rates and gain 
sharing. In other words, if we only consider simple and observable tasks, time-rates and 
gain-sharing provide employees with minimal rents, while piece-rates provide more rents 
for employees. 
For the hard-to-observe tasks, suppose w to be the total income under any of the 
compensation schemes. To make workers devote  e tˆ  amount of effort to hard-to-observe 51 
 
tasks,  total worker income must satisfy 
) ˆ ( '













 . The equation 
indicates that the workers’ total income depends on the marginal disutility of the optimal 
effort allocation and the observability of the hard-to-observe task  ) ˆ ( ' e t p . The harder it is 
to observe  and the higher the desired level of effort on the hard to observe task, which 
depends on its marginal contribution to the firm’s benefit function, the higher the 










t t D t t D
w ˆ
) ˆ ( '







 , the labor costs will be equal under the 
three compensation schemes
t g p L L L   . Because to induce workers to devote large 
amount of effort to hard-to-observe tasks (i.e. a higher ) ˆ , ˆ ( 1 q e t t D ),  the firms need to pay 
large amount of total compensation, which exceeds the rent from piece-rate and makes 










t t D t t D
w ˆ
) ˆ ( '







 , which indicates that the required level of hard-to-
observe tasks is low (i.e. a lower ) ˆ , ˆ ( 1 q e t t D ), the labor costs of piece rates will be strictly 
higher than those of time rates or gain sharing (i.e.
g p L L   and 
t p L L  ).  
In conclusion, the labor costs of piece rates are no less than the labor costs of time 
rates or gain sharing. 
g p L L  and 
t p L L  . 52 
 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
To contrast profits under the different compensation schemes, we need to examine 
the following:  
) ( )) ~ ( ) ˆ ( ( ) (
* * * * t p
p t p t L L E q B q B E E         
) ( )) ~ ( ) ˆ ( (( ) (
* * * * g p
p g p g L L E q B q B E E        . 
Proposition 5 indicates that if Just-In-Time and hard-to-observe tasks are valuable 
to a firm,  0 )] ~ , ( [ )] ˆ , ( [




t   and  0 )] ~ , ( [ )] ˆ , ( [




g  . 
Proposition 6 indicates that 
g p L L  and 
t p L L  . In conclusion, Proposition 5 and 
Proposition 6 imply that 0 ) (
* *     p t E  and  0 ) (
* *     p g E . 
 